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Abstract  
 
Temporary agency work (TAW) is believed to facilitate the matching between 
firms and on-the-job searchers. This leads to shortening of the unemployment and job 
search duration. On the other hand, firms that hire temporary workers have less 
incentive to train them, which makes it difficult for low-skilled temporary workers to 
find a better job in future. Current literature has not established whether TAW 
employment improves the welfare of either or both the employers and employees. 
Therefore, this paper examines the effect of TAW employment in the Japanese labor 
market on employment transitions focusing on individual time preferences. Investments 
in one’s career involve a trade-off between immediate costs and later rewards, and thus, 
individual heterogeneity in time preferences may explain the behavioral patterns of 
labor force. We find that TAW employees have a tendency toward impatience and 
hyperbolic discounting. In addition, those who have held temporary job are less likely 
to move into full-time job positions, but no significant wage differences are observed. 
The strength of the negative effects on the transition probabilities declines over time but 
the significant effects remain over the following years. Our results indicate that TAW 
for employees in Japan is more likely to function as a “dead-end” rather than “stepping 
stone” toward stable full-time employment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In standard economics, temporary work has been thought to enhance labor market 
efficiency (Autor, 2008). A temporary agency, which facilitates the matching between 
firms and on-the-job searchers, is believed to play a role in shortening unemployment 
spells and thus improving the welfare of both the employers and employees. Temporary 
work has therefore been expected to function as a “stepping stone” toward stable 
full-time employment (Guell and Petrongolo, 2007; Ichino et al., 2005; Malo and 
Munoz-Bullon, 2002). Temporary workers, however, receive less work-related training 
than their counterparts in permanent employment (Booth et al., 2002), and thus it 
becomes more difficult for them to find a better job in a stable position as time 
progresses (Autor and Houseman, 2010). Furthermore, long duration temporary 
contracts lead to a reduction in workers’ average job search intensity (Kahn, 2009), 
which again lessens the chances of moving into a more stable employment status.  
In this study, we majorly focus on the factor that determines the probability of 
engaging in temporary agency work (TAW) and the effect of past work experience in 
the TAW sector on the transition to a permanent position, everything else being equal. 
When examining the effects of TAW employment on job transitions, we pay attention to 
individual heterogeneity in time preferences that may affect career paths. Specifically, 
we predict that behavioral patterns of employees concerning short-term and long-term 
impatience explain the probability of entering the TAW sector, which further 
significantly affects the probability of moving into full-time jobs and the wage 
differentials between those who have work experience in the TAW sector and those who 
do not. 
The effects of time preferences on career consequences have been widely 
examined as the investments in one’s career involves a trade-off between immediate 
costs and later rewards. Notably, the exit rate from unemployment status is affected by 
the degree of patience, which varies by the assumptions of exponential and hyperbolic 
discounting (DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005; Paserman, 2008). Impatient agents with 
exponential time preferences tend to lower the reservation wage, and this may increase 
the exit rate from unemployment. Hyperbolic agents, in contrast, are likely to defer job 
search activities and may not lower the level of reservation wages when they finally 
search for a job, leading to a longer duration of unemployment. Job-to-job transitions 
involving internal job promotions and external job mobility are also explained by 
individual time preferences, although it is yet to be established how exponential and/or 
hyperbolic discounting affects job mobility (Drago, 2006; van Huizen, 2010).  
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Our paper empirically examines the long-term welfare of temporary workers in 
Japan, mainly focusing on the following: i) investigation of the relationship between 
time preferences and the probability of engaging in the TAW sector; and ii) examination 
of the probability of TAW workers moving into full-time regular employment and the 
differences in wages between workers who have held a temporary job and those who 
have not. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the 
theoretical background of time preferences that affect individual behaviors and 
describes TAW employment in the Japanese labor market. Section 3 introduces the data 
and how we constructed the main variables regarding time preferences. Section 4 
presents the econometric framework and section 5 reports the estimates of the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT). This paper may clarify the behavioral 
characteristics of TAW employees and their employment transition dynamics in the 
Japanese labor market.  
 
 
2. Time discounting 
 
2.1 Discount function  
A decision maker is assumed to maximize utility over intertemporal choices using 
a discounted utility model. The intertemporal utility function of preferences can be 
expressed as the individual’s well-being at time t+k ሺu୲ା୩ሻ multiplied by his/her 
discount function (δ௞) (Paul, 1937). The discount function (δ௞) is further expressed by 
the discount rate (γ), the individual’s pure rate of time preference, and it is often 
interpreted as the relative weight attached at time t to each individual’s well-being at 
time t+k. The value of each subsequent period decreases at a constant rate, which is 
referred to as exponential discounting. 
U୲ሺu୲, u୲ାଵ … , uTሻ ൌ ∑ δ
୩ݑ௧ା௞,
Tି୲
୩ୀ଴  where δ
௞ ൌ ቀ ଵ
ଵାγ
ቁ
୩
    (1) 
A potential problem of the exponential discounting rate model is that a person may 
not have well-formed plans about costs and benefits and display inconsistent time 
preferences. In order to allow for time inconsistency, quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
models have been proposed as an alternative to the standard exponential model (Laibson, 
1997).  
 
U୲ሺu୲, u୲ାଵ … , uTሻ ൌ u୲ ൅ ߚ∑ δ
௞ݑ௧ା௞,
Tି୲
୩ୀଵ  where 0 ൏ ߚ ൏ 1   (2) 
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In this model, the ߚ  parameter is newly introduced; if ߚ  equals one, it is 
equivalent to the exponential discounting function (1). The implied discount factor from 
the current to the subsequent period is ߚߜ, while the discount factor in the sufficiently 
distant future is simply ߜ. In other words, the per-period discount rate between the 
current and the subsequent period is ଵିఉఋ
ఉఋ
 and the per-period discount rate between any 
two distant future periods is ଵିఋ
ఋ
. The former is higher than the latter, and it implies that 
agents prefer a larger reward in the sufficiently distant future over a smaller one at the 
moment. These hyperbolic agents with inconsistent time preferences are likely to face a 
high degree of short-term impatience again, when the distant future comes near.  
The exponential discounting parameters (δ) capture time-consistent, long-term 
impatience and the hyperbolic discounting parameters (β) capture time-inconsistent, 
short-term impatience. As presented in equations (1) and (2), when β ൌ 1, agents’ (β, δ) 
preferences are time consistent and capture the standard discounted utility model, and 
when β ൏ 1, agents’ (β, δ) preferences follow a quasi-hyperbolic time discounting 
function. Hyperbolic discounting is the most-studied discount utility anomaly. Another 
feature of inconsistent time preferences, which is contradictory to the standard model of 
discounted utility wherein the discount rate should be the same despite the types of 
intertemporal choices, is the “sign effect.” The discount rates for gains are known to be 
higher than those for losses of the same magnitude (Thaler, 1981); for example, people 
are reluctant to borrow and favor a lower interest rate for borrowing than for saving. 
 
2.2 On-the-job search and job-to-job transitions 
The effects of time preferences have been examined on on-the-job searches by the 
unemployed (DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005) and job-to-job transitions, including 
internal promotions and external job mobility (Drago, 2006; van Huizen, 2010). In 
standard economic models of on-the-job searches, under which agents are assumed to 
discount future costs and benefits exponentially, individuals with higher discount rates 
tend to be impatient. Impatience has two inconsistent effects on job search effort and 
reservation wage decision. While impatient agents are more likely to accept the job 
offer despite low wages and exit unemployment, they prefer to avoid the immediate 
costs and defer job search activities (DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005). The effect of 
impatience on job search varies by the assumption of exponential and hyperbolic time 
preferences. If time preferences are constant over time, the reservation wage effect 
works more strongly than the search effect, thereby leading to an increase in the 
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unemployment exit rate. If agents have hyperbolic time preferences, however, the 
search effect dominates the reservation wage effect, and thus, they stay unemployed 
longer. In other words, hyperbolic agents, who are more sensitive to the immediate costs 
of an employment search, are likely to delay their job search activities to a later period, 
such as writing the resume or contacting employers, and thus they are less likely to exit 
from unemployment.  
As for the effects of time preferences on job-to-job transitions, Drago (2006) finds 
that patience is negatively related to external job mobility and positively to work effort; 
patient agents are more likely to stay in the same workplace and pursue the job 
promotion or position change, while impatient agents are more likely to switch jobs for 
better wages. These empirical results, however, may have some limitations associated 
with the assumptions and methodologies: the study assumes that career effort is 
exogenous and job search is characterized by immediate benefits; and it does not 
examine the impact of impatience on search behavior aside from its effect on job 
mobility. Taking these limitations into consideration, van Huizen (2010) finds the 
contrary result that patience has positive effects on both work and search effort, as 
predicted by the hyperbolic discounting model. It is explained that hyperbolic agents are 
likely to procrastinate both internal and external job mobility efforts because these both 
are investment activities involving immediate costs. 
 
2.3 TAW employment in Japan 
    In Japan, a dual labor market comprised of a sector of highly stable employment 
and a considerably less stable sector of part-time, temporary contract workers has 
emerged since the 1970s and has become an important policy agenda, especially after 
the Lehman shock (Rebick, 2005; Okudaira et al., 2011). There has been some evidence 
of rigid mobility within the dual labor market that starting one’s career in less stable 
rather than regular employment reduces one’s probability of being in regular 
employment in the future (Ariga and Okazawa, 2011). Our data also suggest rigidity on 
job transitions between employment types (Appendix 2). On average, only 7.1% of 
employees who were in the TAW sector moved into permanent jobs over the past four 
years. Most part-time and dispatch workers remain in the same sector after one year and 
more. In particular, the mobility of male labor forces between sectors is less fluid than 
that of females. The persistence of the dual labor market leads to the conclusion that a 
temporary contract may act as a trap for long-term unstable employment. 
In Japan, since the enactment of “The Worker Dispatch Law” in 1985, which allows 
project-based employment and the dispatching of temporary workers to demanders, the 
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number of temporary workers has rapidly increased. After the Lehman shock in 1998, 
however, many temporary workers were laid off, and this has drawn the public’s 
attention to the issue of unstable employment status and the need for legal protection. 
New rigid legislation was then enacted to impose a limitation on the contract term of 
temporary workers who are registered with TAW agencies and dispatched to 
manufacturing companies. The contract limitation excludes the TAW employees who 
are classified under the 26 professional categories that require company-specific 
knowledge and experience. The new legislation on TAW employment in Japan was 
formulated to assist temporary workers to become full-time stable employees after a 
certain period of work experience in the TAW sector. However, it may bring the 
unexpected outcome of temporary workers simply being laid off when their contract 
expires and rarely moving into permanent jobs. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1 Global COE Panel data 
    The empirical analyses in this paper are based on data from a questionnaire survey 
titled “Preference and Life Satisfaction Survey,” conducted in Japan. This is a panel 
survey that was started in February 2004 as part of the Osaka University 21st Century 
Center of Excellence Program. It has been conducted annually since 2004 using a 
random sample drawn from 6,000 individuals by a placement method. For the analysis 
on individual behavioral patterns of time preferences on TAW employment and its 
further effects on the probability of transition to permanent jobs, the survey data of 
2009–2011 were used. However, since each year’s questions concern present time 
preferences under the hyperbolic discounting function in a different way, we mainly 
used 2010 data to estimate the exponential and hyperbolic discounting parameters, and 
we used childhood time preferences to analyze the long-term effect on the probability of 
transition and wages over a four-year period. 
 
3.2 TAW employment 
The sample includes all labor force participants aged 20 or over. Our dataset 
enables us to identify the following employment types at the time of the survey: 
permanent employees (PE), temporary employees (TE), dispatched employees (DE), 
self-employed (SE), unemployed and persons who carry out job search activities (UE), 
and those who are not employed and do not look for jobs (NE). Students, retired persons, 
and housewives are dropped from the sample. Since TE and DE are hired on short-term 
8 
 
contracts and their job turnovers are high, only those who are in the labor force at the 
time of the survey are observed; in other words, those whose contracts just expired 
around the time of the survey were not observed. The percentage of dispatched workers 
among the employed in 2010 is on average 1.72% (9.6 million out of 547.8 million) 
(Statistics Bureau, 2012), and this low percentage is reflected in our dataset; only 1.07% 
of the labor force (42 out of 3,938) in the data is categorized into DE. With this small 
number of observations, examining the effect of TAW on the probability of moving into 
permanent jobs, when everything else is controlled, is not possible. Thus, to identify 
individuals in the TAW sector, we asked respondents whether they have ever been 
temporary employees over the past 2 years. TAW employees are defined as those who 
are registered with temporary agencies for a temporary assignment duration ranging 
from i) one day, ii) 2–10 days, iii) 10 days–3 months, to iv) more than 3 months.  
The possible career progression of our sample can be presented with multiple 
career paths (Appendix 1). Before respondents ever held temporary work, they were 
either unemployed or employed; after their experience in the TAW sector, they became 
permanent employees or other types of employees. Those who did not have any jobs 
before the TAW employment could have taken a job offer from the TAW sector or 
remain jobless. Those who already had jobs, on the other hand, could have pursued 
promotions or a position change, or quit their jobs and taken temporary work until they 
could find other jobs offering higher wages. If the analysis is based on the premise that 
some of the unemployed take temporary work and the others remain jobless, these 
subjects may display similar behavioral patterns concerning the job search and 
reservation wage of the unemployed predicted by exponential and hyperbolic 
discounting, as examined by DellaVigna and Paserman (2005). In addition, if we can 
assume that some of the employed continue working for the same employer, and the 
others quit their jobs and take temporary jobs until they find better jobs, these subjects 
may have hyperbolic discounting characteristics, as found by van Huizen (2010). 
However, our data have limitations in examining these on-the-job search and job 
mobility effects from a time preference perspective, as shown in the previous research, 
because the employment type of subjects whose short temporary contracts are expired 
are not clarified during the two-year period. Despite these limitations, because 
individual decisions on career paths, including whether to take temporary jobs, involve 
a trade-off between immediate costs and delayed rewards, we need to control for 
individual heterogeneity in intertemporal choices. Thus, this study predicts that 
individual time preferences and differences in the degree of patience between the near 
and distant future explain the probability of becoming TAW employees and moving into 
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permanent jobs afterward.  
 
3.3 Measure of time preferences 
We use the responses to questions concerning time preferences to construct the 
main independent variables that affect the probabilities of becoming TAW employees 
and subsequently have a negative effect on the transition to full-time employment. To 
measure the discount rate and hyperbolic discounting “during childhood,” we used the 
responses indicated on a five-point scale to the following questions: “When did you 
work on your summer vacation homework?” and “When did you plan to do it?” The 
scale ranged from 1 for the end of the vacation to 5 for the beginning of the vacation. 
Agents who have a preference for delayed rewards over immediate costs to finish the 
assignment are likely to procrastinate their homework during childhood. Thus, they 
allocate more effort to finish the assignment rather than pursue the short-term rewards. 
In other words, the lower the long-term discount factor δ and short-term discount 
factor β, the more subjects care about the immediate costs compared with the distant 
rewards. 
We also constructed proxies for the “present” time discounting using the responses 
to the hypothetical question stated below. The present time preferences may be 
inversely correlated with the probability of having TAW experience because people 
would display hyperbolic characteristics because of their experience in the TAW sector. 
On the other hand, individual time preferences during childhood change because of 
education and/or work experience, and in that case, the present discounting factor 
reflects one’s actual time preferences that affect the individual decision on career paths. 
Thus, we control individual time preferences using both childhood and present time 
discounting factor. We asked the respondents to choose between two options 
concerning intertemporal choices. A single choice between two intertemporal options 
only reveals an upper or lower bound on the discount rate. To identify the discount rate 
more precisely, we present subjects with a series of choices that vary the hypothetical 
rewards over seven days. 
 
 [Hypothetical Question] 
“Let’s assume that you are required to spend time cleaning a park. You need to spend two 
hours today AND next week. It seems that the litter in the park will decrease more than 
expected, so the number of hours you need to clean will be less. To account for this change, 
you have the option to shorten the hours by one hour today or shorten some hours in 7 days. 
Compare the hours and timing below in Option “A” with Option “B” and indicate for each 
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row which option you prefer.” 
 
 
Option “A”  
(Shorten today) 
Option “B”  
(Shorten in 7 days) 
Circle Option “A” or “B” 
1 1 hour 50 minutes         A           B 
2 1 hour 1 hour         A           B 
3 1 hour 1 hour 5 minutes         A           B 
4 1 hour 1 hour 10 minutes         A           B 
5 1 hour 1 hour 15 minutes         A           B 
6 1 hour 1 hour 20 minutes         A           B 
7 1 hour 1 hour 30 minutes         A           B 
8 1 hour 2 hours         A           B 
 
If a respondent chooses option A, which shortens the time by 1 hour today but by 
no time in 7 days rather than option B, which shortens the time by 50 minutes in 7 days 
but by no time today, the respondent is supposed to clean for 1 hour today and 2 hours a 
week later. The respondents would choose an option that they think would provide more 
favorable conditions. We expected that many respondents would choose option A at the 
beginning because the total shortening of time of option A is longer than that of option 
B, but eventually switch to option “B” at a certain point when they feel indifferent 
between options A and B over two different time periods. Those with a higher discount 
rate would not change to option B until a shortened time in 7 days is substantially 
longer than that of today.  
From each question, we computed the discount rate of each row (γሻ: ݐ஺ ൌ ሺ
ଵ
ଵାγ
ሻ ݐ஻, 
where ݐ஺ሺ஻ሻ is the length of the shortened time of option A (B). Then the discount rate 
of an individual is computed by estimating a log-normal distribution for the discount 
rate’s log (1+γ) of options (Kimball et al., 2008). For example, if the respondent selects 
option A for the first 3 rows and switches to option B in the 4th row, then log (1+γ) is 
computed from a log-normal distribution of the discount rate of the 3rd and 4th row. 
Then, we converted the discount rates (γሻ to the discounting factors (δሻ by taking the 
exponential of the discounting rates and inversing the values ሺδ ൌ ሺ1/ሺ1 ൅ γሻ). The 
discount factor for the near future (βδሻ is constructed from the intertemporal choices 
between today and 7 days, and the discount factor for distant futures (δሻ is constructed 
from the same choices with difference time sets―90 days versus 97 days. Next a proxy 
for the hyperbolic discounting parameter (β) is calculated by the ratio of βδ to δ. 
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Someone who currently prefers immediate rewards over future benefits but who 
suspects that they will have the same preferences in the distant future, might attempt to 
choose avoiding the immediate rewards in the distant future choice sets. These 
hyperbolic agents doubt that their preferences will change over time and eliminate an 
option that seems inferior now but might attract them later. 
 
 
4. The econometric framework 
 
4.1 Notation 
The ATT attempts to reduce the bias in the estimation of treatment effects with 
non-randomized observational data sets. To estimate the actual effect of a treatment on 
the potential outcome of an individual, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed the 
propensity score matching method (PSM), which compares outcomes performed by 
treated and control subjects who are as similar as possible. The average treatment effect 
of the program is then calculated as the mean difference in outcomes across the treated 
group and the statistical counterfactual group that has similar observed characteristics to 
those of the treated group.  
To estimate how treated agents would have performed if they had not received the 
treatment, the untreated agents that have similar characteristics are substituted for the 
counterfactual group. The PSM approach is used to construct this unobserved or 
counterfactual group. In case of a binary treatment, the treatment indicator T equals one 
if individual i receives treatment and zero otherwise, and X is the multidimensional 
vector of pre-treatment characteristics. The potential outcomes are then defined as 
௜ܻሺ ௜ܶሻ for each individual i, where i =1, …, n. The average treatment effect of an 
individual i can be estimated as follows: 
 Eሾ ௜ܻሺ1ሻ െ ௜ܻሺ0ሻ|  ௜ܶ ൌ 1ሿ ൌ  Eሾܧሺ ௜ܻሺ1ሻ െ ௜ܻሺ0ሻ|  ௜ܶ ൌ 1, pሺXሻሿ 
ൌ ܧሺܧሾ ௜ܻሺ1ሻ|  ௜ܶ ൌ 1, pሺXሻሿሻ െ ܧሺܧሾ ௜ܻሺ0ሻ|  ௜ܶ ൌ 1, pሺXሻሿሻ 
The potential outcome of the treated group who has not received the treatment 
(Eሾ ௜ܻሺ0ሻ| ௜ܶ ൌ 1ሿ) is not observed. What is actually observed is ܧሾ ௜ܻሺ0ሻ|  ௜ܶ ൌ 0ሿ but it 
may not be a good alternative because the group without the treatment would have an 
outcome different from that with treatment regardless of the treatment effect; this is 
known as selection bias. A proper substitute for this counterfactual group is the 
untreated agents who are similar to the treated agents and are found on the basis of the 
probability of taking treatment given a vector of observed variables. The fact that only 
inside the range of the observed data points is extrapolated is different from ordinary 
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regression. 
 
4.2 PSM methods 
To validate the PSM methods, the following two assumptions should be satisfied. 
First, given a set of observable covariates X that are not affected by treatment, the 
outcomes Y௜஼ of the control group should be independent of treatment assignment T. 
This assumption is called “conditional independence” or “unconfoundedness”: 
Y௜
஼ ٣ ௜ܶ | X௜. For a given propensity score, exposure to treatment―work experience as 
TAW employees over the past 2 years―should be random and therefore treated and 
control groups differ only in their error term, which is approximately independent of X. 
The probability of transition to permanent employment of the control group should not 
influence the choice of the individual to engage in the TAW sector over the past 2 years.  
A second condition, called “common support,” ensures that there are sufficiently 
large observations in the overlapped region of propensity score distribution: 
Pሺ ௜ܶ ൌ 1| ௜ܺሻ ൏ 1. The substantial region of propensity score distribution should be 
overlapped between those who have two years of experience of TAW employment and 
those who do not. The overlap condition for individuals with the same x value in X are 
allowed to have a positive probability of being in treated and control groups.  
When the two assumptions hold, the balancing hypothesis that observations with 
the same propensity score must have the same distribution of (un)observable 
characteristics independently of treatment status is tested. The test is repeated until the 
means of each characteristic are equal for treated and control units in all intervals of the 
propensity score. If the means of one or more characteristics are unequal, the balancing 
properties are unsatisfied and a better parsimonious specification of the covariates is 
required. If treatment and control groups with the same propensity score are identically 
distributed, the ATT model is established using the PSM estimator.  
߬஺்்
௉ௌெ ൌ ܧሾ ௜ܻ
்ห ௜ܶ ൌ 1, ܲሺܺሻሿ െ Eሾ ௜ܻ
஼| ௜ܶ ൌ 1, ܲሺܺሻሿ 
We use a stratified nearest-neighbor matching algorithm that matches treatment 
and control cases on the closest propensity score. Cሺiሻ denotes the set of control units 
matched to the treated unit i with an estimated value of the propensity score of ݌௜. The 
nearest neighbor matching set is Cሺiሻ ൌ ݉݅ ௝݊ צ ݌௜ െ ݌௝ צ. More explicitly, with 
cross-section data and within the common support, the treatment effect can be written as 
follows (see Heckman et al., 1997; Smith and Todd, 2005):  
τPSM ൌ
1
NT
෍ሾY୧
T െ
୧אT
෍ ω௜௝Y୨
C
୨אCሺ୧ሻ
ሿ 
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= ଵ
NT
ൣ∑ Y୧
T െ୧אT ∑ ∑ ω௜௝Y୨
C
୨אCሺ୧ሻ୧אT ൧ 
= ଵ
NT
∑ Y୧
T െ ଵ
NT
∑ ω௝Y୨
C
୨אCሺ୧ሻ୧אT  
NT  is the number of participants i and ω௜௝  is the weight used to aggregate 
outcomes for the matched nonparticipants j: ω௜௝ ൌ
ଵ
ே೔
಴  if ݆ א Cሺiሻ   and ω௜௝ ൌ 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
The number of people who have ever held temporary work in 2010 is 7.2% (Table 
1). The sample used for the analysis includes all persons classified as employed and 
unemployed. Approximately half of the samples have been hired as permanent full-time 
employees at the time of survey collection, of which 3.4% answered that they have 
experience working as temporary workers over the past two years. Table 2 shows 
average individual characteristics and time preferences variables, which were collected 
from the same questionnaire for both the treated and control groups from the same 
Japanese labor market. The observable characteristics of the treated and control groups, 
which are balanced on the basis of the observed variables, are very similar and the 
differences between the treated and control groups are smaller than between the treated 
and the entire control group. 
 Time preference variables indicate that individuals with TAW experience have a 
tendency for procrastination or impatience, and they have a lower (higher) discount 
factor (rate) and a lower hyperbolic discounting parameter. This suggests that TAW 
employees are likely to be impatient and have inconsistent time preferences. The last 
columns of Table 2 reveal that the treated group with the TAW experience shows 
potentially lower earnings and more limited employment opportunities to move into 
permanent jobs in the future. The important questions addressed in this study are, when 
all observatory variables are held constant, whether those who have ever held temporary 
work remain in the informal sector or move into permanent jobs and whether the 
earnings of individuals who have work experience in the TAW sector are statistically 
different from those who do not. 
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5.2 Effects of behavioral characteristics  
The propensity score was predicted from a logistic regression of TAW employment 
on individual characteristics such as income, age, assets, marital status, number of 
children, and educational backgrounds (Table 3). Models (1) and (2) are controlled by 
childhood time preferences imputed from summer vacation homework (see Table 1). 
Models (3) and (4) use the present time preferences computed from the hypothetical 
question about cleaning a park.  
Models (1) and (3) estimate exponential discounting parameters when β equals 1, 
and models (2) and (4) present hyperbolic discounting parameters given the same β. 
Time preferences may play a significant role in identifying the behavior of subjects who 
have been in the TAW sector compared with other types of employees, ceteris paribus: i) 
exponential discounting parameters (δ) are negatively correlated to TAW employment 
but the childhood discounting parameter has no significant effect; ii) the degrees of 
hyperbolic discounting parameters (β), with the same discount factors (δ), have 
significant negative effects in our model. Including the hyperbolic discounting 
parameters (β) in the model, which capture time-inconsistent and short-term impatience, 
improves the explanatory power of the model, and their effects on TAW employment 
are significant given the long-term impatience parameters (δ). This implies that the 
models support the hyperbolic discounting function, whereby discount rates are not 
constant but declining. 
Although these results should be interpreted with caution, they may suggest that 
agents who prefer immediate pay despite potential long-term loss caused by unstable, 
temporary types of employment have a high probability of working in the TAW sector. 
This includes subjects that were either unemployed or employed before they had taken 
the TAW work. The then unemployed would have found more stable, permanent jobs if 
they had dedicated more time and energy in searching for jobs that adequately engage 
their capabilities, while the then employed may have received internal promotions if 
they had not quit and taken temporary work. Our findings that TAW employment is 
related to hyperbolic discounting parameters ( β ) may imply that agents have 
inconsistent time preferences over intertemporal choices. 
A significant role of behavioral characteristics is also found concerning the 
balancing property when PSM are employed. When we predict the propensity property 
without controls for time preferences, the balancing property is not satisfied and a 
different specification of the propensity score needs to be considered. In other words, 
without time preference variables, the model fails to find the control groups that are 
distributed identically throughout all blocks. This suggests that time preference 
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characteristics contribute to identifying the significant differences between those who 
have work experience in the TAW sector and those who do not. 
    Besides the discount parameters, Table 3 presents parameters of other observed 
characteristics. Agents who have less financial assets, are not married, and women are 
more likely to enter the TAW sector. The sign effect does not appear to be significant 
concerning whether the individual has held temporary work but it controls one feature 
of the discounted-utility anomaly and improves the explanatory power of the models. 
With the controls of individual characteristics and sign effect, agents’ time preferences 
appear to have significant effects on the probability of engaging in the TAW sector: 
hyperbolic agents may have a higher probability of becoming temporary workers. For 
the labor force in the TAW sector, it may gain immediate rewards from earnings but lose 
the chance to obtain a more stable job if TAW employment has a negative effect on the 
probability of transition to full-time employment. However, if TAW employment acts as 
a spring board, the gains and losses may work in opposite ways.  
 
5.3 Impact of TAW employment experience: Transition probability & wages 
By the PSM methods, the closest group that has similar observatoary 
characteristics was found, and the treated and control groups are approximately 
balanced on the variables predicting the propensity score. The density distributions of 
the propensity scores are found in Figure 1. The bottom-half of the graph shows the 
propensity scores distribution for the non-treated, while the upper-half refers to the 
treated individuals. This figure presents the existence of a substantially overlapped 
propensity distribution between the treated and the untreated. The effects of TAW 
employment on the probability of transition to permanent employment and wage 
differences are reported in Table 4.  
Row (i) shows a base model that includes no observatory characteristics when 
predicting the propensity score and further estimating the ATT. The following rows (ii) 
and (iii) include the behavior patterns of impatience (Table 3: model (2) of PSM) and 
time inconsistency (Table 3: model (4) of PSM), as well as the individual characteristics 
explained in section 5.1. In all cases, we found that the experience in TAW employment 
has a significant negative effect on the probability of moving into a stable job. When 
confounding variables are properly controlled, the effects of the TAW employment on 
the transition probability are still negatively significant. Those who have experience 
working in the TAW sector have a significant and negative effect of 26 (or 31) 
percentage points on the probability of becoming permanent employees in comparison 
with those who have the same observatory characteristics but do not have work 
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experience in the TAW sector.  
Table 4 also reports the TAW employment effects on wages with the same structure 
as the transition probability. With no controls for individual characteristics, it seems that 
the TAW employment experience has a significant negative effect on the hourly wage. 
When the individual behavioral characteristics are controlled, however, the statistical 
significance disappears. This is different from the case of the transition probability, 
which shows significant negative correlations with the TAW experience even when the 
confounding variables are controlled. The TAW experience may defer the agents from 
moving into a more stable job but it does not necessarily mean that their wages are 
significantly lower than those for the other types of employees. It is possible that 
project-based workers or seasonal workers who are hired on a contingency basis do not 
earn less than other types of employees for the time being, but the wage gap may widen 
in the long run. 
 
5.4 Long-term impact of the TAW employment experience 
To observe the long-term effects on the transition probability and wages, we ran a 
regression to estimate the effect of TAW employment at the time of survey (t) on the 
probability of transition to permanent employment and hourly wages after one to three 
years (t+1, t+2, t+3). The comparison of each subsequent period allows us to observe 
the change in the strength of the effects over time. The effect of the TAW experience on 
wages is not statistically significant in either the long term or the short term (Table 5). 
There is a possibility that the negative effect on wages between TAW and permanent 
employees may be shown after a much longer period of time, but at least within 3 years 
such effects are not observed in our data.  
In case of transition probability models, however, the effects decrease in the 
following years but still remain statistically significant. Those who have ever had past 
work experience in the TAW sector had difficulty achieving stable employment in the 
following years. The findings that experience working as TAW employees has a 
negative effect in Japan may be explained by the characteristics of the rigid Japanese 
labor market: the transition to other employment types is difficult and any experience of 
being hired as TAW workers in the past might provide negative signals to potential 
employers in Japan. 
  
5.5 Robustness test & unmeasured bias 
Our research interest lies in those who are involuntarily in the TAW sector but have 
attempted to move to permanent jobs. One may question the presence of individuals, 
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more likely women, who select the TAW employment type for better work-life balance 
despite the unstable status and lower wages. Regardless of gender, older cohorts 
approaching retirement age may have a lower probability or less incentive to move into 
the primary sector. To investigate whether gender and age differences have a significant 
effect on the transition probability, we examine the effect of TAW employment with the 
sample grouped by sex and by different age ranges: younger cohorts aged less than 40, 
the median age (52), and retirement age (60) (Table 6). 
The results indicate that being in the TAW sector decreases an individual’s 
probability of being in permanent employment and its significant negative effects 
remain even when the sample is grouped by gender or age. In particular, with the 
controls for the present time preference characteristics, the significant negative effects 
appear to be constant over all ranges of age. The effect of TAW employment on hourly 
wages, on the other hand, is not found to be significant in the whole sample. The effects 
with a restricted sample by gender or age are also not observed, and in addition, the sign 
of the effects are not consistent. The restricted samples who are males and older than the 
retirement age and have held temporary work have a probability of earning less but they 
are not significant at the 10% significance level. The specification requires careful 
interpretation when the sample becomes too small: for example, the sample aged 60 and 
over or those aged 40 and less.  
 
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
Propensity-score matching estimators are not consistent estimators for treatment 
effects if unobserved variables that affect the assignment process are also related to the 
outcomes. In order to estimate the extent to which such “selection on unobservables” 
may bias the probability of moving into a stable permanent job, we use Rosenbaum’s 
(2002) procedure for bounding the treatment effect estimates (see Becker and Caliendo, 
2007). If there is a hidden bias, two individuals with the same observed covariates x 
have different chances of receiving treatment. The odds that individuals receive 
treatment are then given by P౟
ଵିP౟
 and
Pౠ
ଵିPౠ
, and the odds ratio is as follows: 
P୧/ሺ1 െ P୧ሻ
P୨/ሺ1 െ P୨ሻ
ൌ
P୧ሺ1 െ P୨ሻ
P୨ሺ1 െ P୧ሻ
ൌ
exp ሺβx୧ ൅ γu୧ሻ
exp ሺβx୨ ൅ γu୨ሻ
ൌ exp൛γሺu୧ െ u୨ሻൟ 
If both units have identical observed covariates―as implied by the matching 
procedure—the x vector cancels out. To have no hidden bias, u୧ should be equal to u୨, 
implying that there are no differences in unobserved variables, or γ should be zero, 
implying no influence of unobserved variables on y. Rosenbaum (2002) shows that the 
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equation implies the following bounds on the odds ratio that either of the two matched 
individuals will receive treatment: ଵ
ୣγ
൑
P౟ሺଵିPౠሻ
PౠሺଵିP౟ሻ
൑ eγ.  
Since transition probabilities are binary outcomes, we use the Mantel–Haenszel 
(1959) test statistic proposed by Aakvik (2001). The results are presented in Table 7. 
The Q+MH (Q−MH) statistic adjusts the MH statistic downward for positive (negative) 
selection. If eγ ൌ Γ ൌ 1, it means both matched individuals have the same probability 
of engaging in the TAW sector. If both Q+MH and Q−MH statistics are significant, the 
estimators are robust against the unobserved factors. In other words, there appears to be 
no hidden bias that influences the assignment into treatment.  
As for the upper bounds under the assumption that we have overestimated the 
treatment effect, the significance levels on all bounds are less than the 0.01 level. This 
indicates that the study is insensitive to the upward bias. Given the negative estimated 
treatment effect, the bounds under the assumption of underestimation deserve more 
attention. With the value of Γ = 2, the result remains significant at the 1% level and 
ܳ௠௛
ି  is on the decrease but still significant at the 10% level (summer vacation 
homework) and 5% level (cleaning a park). This suggests that negative selection bias 
does not occur. Since an unmeasured variable does not appear to cause the odds of 
receiving the treatment to differ between the treatment and comparison groups, the 
confidence intervals for the effect of TAW employment on the transition to permanent 
jobs seem reliable.  
Regarding the effects of the TAW employment on hourly wages, which are 
continuous variables, we check the Rosenbaum bounds (Table 8). Without any 
controlled observatory characteristics, TAW experience seems to have a significant 
negative effect on hourly wage, but we could not find any significant short-term and 
long-term effects when individual characteristics and time preferences were held 
constant. Regarding the negative selection bias, when the value of Γ reaches 1.1 or 
higher, the significance levels decline and become less than 0.01. This implies that a 
downward bias in the estimated treatment effects does not happen, but the significance 
values under the assumption of overestimation indicate that the effects may be 
overestimated. This indicates that individuals who are most likely to become TAW 
employees tend to have higher hourly wages even without treatment, given that they 
have the same observatory characteristics as the individuals in the comparison group. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
There are both positive and negative views about TAW employment. From a 
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positive perspective, temporary contracts are believed to avoid labor inflexibility to 
some extent. For firms, it provides a compelling incentive to utilize TAW employees as 
a buffer stock of employment or for leave replacement. As for employees, TAW could 
act as stepping stones to permanent employment in good jobs. On the other hand, the 
low levels of retention and motivation, the lack of opportunities for career advancement, 
lower satisfaction in certain job components, and less work-related training are thought 
to be very negative aspects of TAW, because they act as deterrents to workers moving 
into full-time regular employment. These characteristics may lead to a longer duration 
of TAW employment once they are hired as temporary workers. 
We examined whether TAW employment is explained by individual heterogeneity 
in intertemporal choices and whether the TAW experience has a negative or positive 
effect on the probability of moving into a permanent job and wages in the long run. Due 
to the several career paths available before, after, and during the experience in the TAW 
sector for the past 2 years, we may not have accurately defined the effects of time 
preferences on TAW employment from a time preference perspective. However, 
individual decisions on career paths including whether to take temporary jobs involve a 
trade-off between immediate costs and delayed rewards, and thus, time preferences may 
account for individual unobserved choice characteristics. The estimation results indicate 
that agents with TAW employment appear to have time inconsistent preferences and 
thus, they present higher discount rates in the near future than in the distant future. 
Another area of interest is the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated, or ATT, which 
measures the impact of experiencing TAW employment on transition probabilities and 
wages. The treated and control groups have identical distributions over a substantial 
range. The results estimated inside the range of the observed data points indicate that 
those who have ever held temporary work have a lower probability of moving into 
permanent jobs and the significant negative effect lasts a long time, although the effect 
sizes decrease as time progresses. On the other hand, wage differentials are not 
significant between those who have work experience as TAW employees and those who 
do not. The effects of TAW employment on wages remain insignificant over these 
periods.  
With the available data, we are unable to accurately compare the impact of TAW 
employment before and after the enactment of the new legislation in 2010, because our 
most recent data collected in 2011 contain information on TAW experience during the 
period 2009–2010. We need further data containing respondents with TAW experience 
only after 2010 to compare with those with TAW experience before 2010. Although we 
cannot assure whether the effect of TAW experience during the period 2009–2010 stems 
20 
 
from the enactment of the new legislation, the fact that TAW experience during the 
given period has a significant, larger, and negative effect on the probability of transition 
into permanent employment in 2011 implies that the negative effect might have been 
reinforced by the strict legislation. Then, one may question how the legislation 
correlates with the behavioral patterns of temporary workers. 
A stricter legislation may play a role of making impatient, hyperbolic agents 
recognize their own self-control problems and driving then to pursue the long-run 
rewards with payment for the immediate costs. To be more specific, the level of 
sophistication versus naivety has tangible implications on public policy formulation and 
implementation. If the current TAW workers are sophisticated enough to pay for the 
immediate costs for the rewards accrued in the distant future, the strict legislation may 
act as a stimulus device for them to attempt for the stable jobs more eagerly than before. 
It could then lessen the number of people preferring short-run rewards, who otherwise 
would have become full-time workers with a better pay. However, if they are too naive, 
the prohibition on the dispatch work may discourage them from finding any kind of jobs 
from the first. In this case, the policies that educate and train people to find jobs that 
matches their abilities rather than stricken may contribute to the welfare of the 
employees. The further research with additional data is required to examine how 
hyperbolic agents who are more likely to engage in temporary work would behave after 
the enactment of the legislation. 
To assess the robustness of matching estimators, we also examined whether there 
exist unobserved variables that affect assignment into treatment and the outcome 
variable simultaneously. We used the bounding approach suggested by Rosenbaum and 
the results indicate that we do not observe any effects caused by an unmeasured variable 
regarding the transition probability, and the effects are neither downward nor upward 
biased across all bounds. This shows that the inference in the regression results on 
transition probabilities would not change because of different values on unobserved 
factors despite being identical on the matched covariates. Because of the limited time 
period of our data, we were not able to accurately examine the long-term effect or the 
impact after the legislation enactment from time preferences’ perspective. Nevertheless, 
the combined evidence that this study finds suggests that TAW for employees in Japan 
during the 2009-2011 time period is more likely to function as a “dead-end” rather than 
“stepping stone” toward stable full-time employment.  
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Table 1 Definitions of variables 
Variables Definitions obs mean s.d.
Summer vacation homework:
Proxy for exponential discounting
 (      )
Response to the question “When did you plan to do your homework assignments?” on a 5-point scale,
from 1 (at the end of the vacation) to 5 (at the beginning of the vacation). 1664 3.977 0.958
Summer vacation homework:
Proxy for hyperbolic discounting
 (      )
Using the responses to the question “When did you do your homework assignments?” on a 5-point
scales, from 1 (at the end of the vacation) to 5 (at the beginning of the vacation) and the responses to
the question as regards to when the subjects planned to do the homework explained above, the
hyperbolic discounting was constructed by dividing the second responses (action) by the first
responses (plan) or differencing from the first responses (plan) to the second responses (action).
1664 0.708 0.323
Cleaning a park:
Proxy for exponential discounting
 (      )
Responses to the question “Let’s assume that you were required to spend time cleaning a park, and you
have the option to shorten the hours by one hour in 90 days or shorten some hours in 97 days”
Discounting rates for every choice computed and converted to discounting factors for the distant
future.
1446 0.903 0.359
Cleaning a park:
Proxy for hyperbolic discounting
 (      )
Comparing with discounting factors for the near future (today versus in 7 days), short-run impatience
is computed dividing discounting factor of the near future by discounting factor of the distant future. 1352 1.026 0.246
Sign effect The difference in the discount rate imputed from receipt of $100 tomorrow to the discount rateimputed from payment of the same amount tomorrow. 1827 0.002 0.077
Household income (excluding
oneself) Per-capita household income (excluding oneself) in million yen. 1664 3.194 3.300
Age Ages of repondents 1664 48.011 10.959
Household property (Land / Per-capita household property including lands and housings in million yen 1664 18.747 20.636
Household financial assets Per-capita household financial assets in million yen 1664 11.231 15.882
Household Housing Loans Per-capita household mortgages in million yen 1664 6.181 8.901
Household other debts Per-capita household debt holding other than mortgages in million yen 1664 0.782 1.971
Number of children Number of children at the time of survey 1664 1.800 1.061
Married (=1) A binary indicator for marrital status which equals 1 if married and 0 otherwise 1664 0.808 0.394
Educational Level A continuous variable ranging from 1 (lower than middle school level)–5 (higher than graduate schoollevel) [Descriptive Stats: High school level] 1664 0.460 0.499
Female (=1) A binary indicator for females which equals 1 for female repondents 0 otherwise 1664 0.436 0.496
dispatched experience (=1) A binary indicator which equals 1 if the respondent has ever held temporary work for the past 2 yearsand 0 otherwise 1664 0.072 0.259
PE (Permanet Employment) A binary indicator for employment status which equals 1 if respondents have permanent jobs and 0otherwise. 1630 0.556 0.497
Hourly wage A continuous variable computed by a ratio of hourly/monthly/yearly wage to labor hours (Maximumvalue is five hundred yen). 1541 1713.990 2156.826
ߚ
ߜ
ߚ
ߜ
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of treated and control groups 
 
 
Mean S.E Min Max Mean S.E Min Max Mean S.E Min Max
Summer Vacation
Homework
Proxy for exponential discounting 3.99 0.96 1 5 3.98 0.96 1 5 3.98 0.96 1 5
Proxy for hyperbolic discounting 0.65 0.34 0.20 2.00 0.71 0.32 0.20 2.00 0.71 0.32 0.20 2.00
Gain & Loss asymmetry
(Discount utility anomaly) Sign Effect -0.003 0.07 -0.34 0.40 0.001 0.08 -0.41 0.40 0.001 0.08 -0.41 0.40
Individual Characteristics Household income (excluding oneself)in million yen 3.05 2.95 0 13.5 3.11 3.21 0 17 3.21 3.33 0 19.5
Age 47.158 11.855 22 74 47.782 10.885 21 75 48.077 10.887 21 75
Household property (Land / Housing) in
million yen 17.63 20.32 0 100 17.58 18.98 0 100 18.83 20.66 0 100
Household financial assets in million yen 7.04 8.97 1.25 40 8.60 9.42 1.25 75 11.56 16.25 1.25 100
Household Housing Loans in million yen 4.9 8.0 0 30 6.3 8.9 0 30 6.3 9.0 0 30
Household other debts in million yen 0.76 1.95 0 10 0.77 1.92 0 10 0.78 1.97 0 10
Number of children 1.67 1.15 0 5 1.81 1.06 0 5 1.81 1.05 0 5
Married (=1) 0.69 0.46 0 1 0.82 0.39 0 1 0.82 0.39 0 1
Educational Level 1 (Junior high school
and lower) 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.05 0.21 0 1
Educational Level 2 (High school) 0.45 0.50 0 1 0.46 0.50 0 1 0.46 0.50 0 1
Educational Level 3 (Junior college) 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.16 0.36 0 1
Educational Level 4 (University) 0.22 0.41 0 1 0.30 0.46 0 1 0.30 0.46 0 1
Educational Level 5 (Graduate school
and higher) 0.03 0.16 0 1 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.03 0.17 0 1
Female (=1) 0.66 0.48 0 1 0.43 0.50 0 1 0.42 0.49 0 1
TAW experience (=1) 1.00 0.00 1 1 0.00 0.00 0 0 0.00 0.00 0 0
PE (Permanent Employment) 0.25 0.44 0 1 0.57 0.49 0 1 0.58 0.49 0 1
Hourly wage (unit: yen) 1325.73 843.39 529.63 5163.94 1702.81 2237.78 500.00 57377.05 1744.71 2225.21 500.00 57377.05
Treated Group Matched Controls
Cleaning a Park
Proxy for exponential discounting 0.86 0.37 0.38
Proxy for hyperbolic discounting 1.00 0.15 0.24
Variables
0.38 1.57
0.24 4.16
Dependent variables
0.36
0.26
1.57 0.91
1.031.85 1.03 0.25 0.24 4.16
Matched Controls
0.91 0.36 0.38 1.57
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Table 3 Estimation of the propensity score  
 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Note: A proxy for hyperbolic discounting parameter β used for the model (2) is imputed from the 
ratio of when respondents did homework (action) to when they planned doing it (plan). When we used the 
proxy calculated from the difference between action and plan, the parameter is still significant at 5% level 
(coefficient: −0.198; standard error: 0.082). When the sample is grouped by gender, the hyperbolic 
discounting parameters are still negatively significant among males (coefficient, −1.035; standard error, 
Discounting parameters
-0.673 ** -1.118 *
(0.327) (0.657)
-0.062 -0.108 -0.546 * -0.612 **
(0.104) (0.109) (0.293) (0.294)
-0.581 -0.581 -1.209 -1.260
(1.268) (1.268) (1.312) (1.313)
Individual Characteristics
-0.049 -0.049 -0.041 -0.042
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
0.006 0.009 0.007 0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
-0.040 *** -0.039 *** -0.037 *** -0.038 ***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
-0.017 -0.017 -0.034 ** -0.033 **
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
-0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007
(0.052) (0.052) (0.057) (0.058)
-0.032 -0.029 -0.146 -0.150
(0.109) (0.108) (0.116) (0.117)
-0.520 ** -0.519 * -0.417 -0.413
(0.264) (0.266) (0.275) (0.275)
Educational Level Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Female(=1) 0.994 *** 1.026 *** 0.893 *** 0.904 ***
(0.233) (0.233) (0.237) (0.237)
Cons -2.097 *** -1.531 * -1.472 * -0.270
(0.790) (0.840) (0.734) (1.009)
Number of Observations 1973 1973 1493 1493
Log-Likelihood -470.332 -467.467 -358.651 -356.794
LR statistic 54.44 *** 60.17 *** 57.99 *** 61.71 ***
Household other debts
Number of children
Married (=1)
Sign Effect
Household income
(excluding him/herself)
Age
Household property (Land /
Housing)
Household financial assets
Household Housing Loans
Cleaning a ParkSummer Vacation Homework
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ߜ
ߚ
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0.573), but not among females (coefficient, −0.467; standard error, 0.413). It implies the effect of 
individual time preferences work more strongly on male employees’ probability of being in the TAW 
sector. Moreover, when we controlled for childhood and present time preferences together (correlation: 
hyperbolic discounting, −0.0058; exponential discounting, 0.0419), the effect of hyperbolic discounting 
of childhood remains significant (coefficient, −0.721; standard error, 0.359). This suggests that the 
childhood time preferences have a significant effect on the probability of engaging in temporary work 
with or without the control for the present time preferences.
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Table 4 Effect of TAW employment on transition probability and wage differences 
Treated
Group
Control
Group ATT Std. Err. T value
(i) 238 2846 -0.309 0.029 -10.547
(ii) 120 111 -0.263 0.063 -4.164
(iii) 108 97 -0.311 0.068 -4.591
Treated
Group
Control
Group ATT Std. Err. T value
(i) 238 2367 -433.215 64.861 -6.679
(ii) 120 96 36.153 99.451 0.364
(iii) 108 92 15.058 128.411 0.117
Transition Probability
Hourly Wages
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Table 5 Long-term effects of TAW employment 
 
Note: To control for individual heterogeneity in time preferences, the degree of impatience during 
childhood is used since the questions for each year is concerning the present time preferences under 
the hyperbolic discounting function, in a different way. 
Time Treated Group Control Group ATT Std. Err. T value
t 142 126 -0.29 0.06 -4.802
t+1 142 123 -0.217 0.062 -3.512
t+2 142 117 -0.198 0.063 -3.143
t 120 111 -0.263 0.063 -4.164
t+1 120 99 -0.138 0.067 -2.064
2011 t 124 111 -0.356 0.061 -5.885
Time Treated Group Control Group ATT Std. Err. T value
t 238 209 -112.982 104.004 -1.086
t+1 238 182 146.576 143.535 1.021
t+2 238 160 44.738 99.31 0.45
t 120 96 36.153 99.451 0.364
t+1 120 89 -7.858 106.787 -0.074
2011 t 124 107 -145.011 92.301 -1.571
2009
2010
Transition Probability
2009
2010
Hourly Wage
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Table 6 Effects of TAW employment by gender and age 
Treated
Group
Control
Group ATT Std. Err. T value
Whole Sample 120 111 -0.263 0.063 -4.164
High propensity score region 37 26 -0.482 0.125 -3.866
Male 41 35 -0.287 0.112 -2.57
Female 79 70 -0.289 0.075 -3.861
Oder than 60 17 10 -0.25 0.161 -1.553
Aged 60 and less 103 94 -0.143 0.07 -2.043
Older than 52 36 33 -0.029 0.103 -0.286
Aged 52 and less 84 71 -0.217 0.082 -2.66
Aged 40 and less 36 28 -0.41 0.13 -3.149
Treated
Group
Control
Group ATT Std. Err. T value
Whole Sample 108 97 -0.311 0.068 -4.591
High propensity score region 43 36 -0.321 0.11 -2.925
Male 40 37 -0.315 0.11 -2.869
Female 68 55 -0.13 0.085 -1.531
Oder than 60 17 15 -0.333 0.126 -2.646
Aged 60 and less 91 79 -0.244 0.077 -3.166
Older than 52 33 30 -0.245 0.114 -2.151
Aged 52 and less 75 65 -0.236 0.087 -2.717
Aged 40 and less 35 28 -0.306 0.135 -2.273
Treated
Group
Control
Group ATT Std. Err. T value
Whole Sample 120 96 36.153 99.451 0.364
High propensity score region 37 23 -8.226 157.127 -0.052
Male 41 35 0.737 319.474 0.002
Female 79 63 1.558 103.165 0.015
Oder than 60 17 11 -874.679 495.296 -1.766
Aged 60 and less 103 90 -89.35 150.451 -0.594
Older than 52 36 29 -55.593 400.827 -0.139
Aged 52 and less 84 64 -12.897 103.228 -0.125
Aged 40 and less 36 26 27.085 131.479 0.206
Treated
Group
Control
Group ATT Std. Err. T value
Whole Sample 108 92 15.058 128.411 0.117
High propensity score region 38 27 54.402 152.541 0.357
Male 40 33 -1913.822 1750.449 -1.093
Female 68 47 -58.111 104.706 -0.555
Oder than 60 17 14 -336.002 327.884 -1.025
Aged 60 and less 91 78 128.595 123.263 1.043
Older than 52 33 25 -374.791 343.799 -1.09
Aged 52 and less 75 62 -182.425 206.274 -0.884
Aged 40 and less 35 24 -70.775 135.524 -0.522
Summer Vacation Homework
Cleaning a Park
Transition Probability
Hourly Wage
Summer Vacation Homework
Cleaning a Park
ߚ, ߜ
ߚ, ߜ
ߚ, ߜ
ߚ, ߜ
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Table 7 Mantel–Haenszel test statistics 
 
Note: Gamma is log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors; Q_mh+ (－): Mantel–Haenszel statistic 
[assumption: overestimation (underestimation) of treatment effect]; p_mh+(－): significance level [assumption: 
overestimation (underestimation) of treatment effect]. 
Probability of transition to permanent employment (2010)
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh-
1 3.87824 3.87824 0.000053 0.000053
1.05 4.06885 3.70478 0.000024 0.000106
1.1 4.2434 3.53214 0.000011 0.000206
1.15 4.41081 3.36769 5.10E-06 0.000379
1.2 4.5717 3.2107 2.40E-06 0.000662
1.25 4.72658 3.06053 1.10E-06 0.001105
1.3 4.87594 2.91659 5.40E-07 0.001769
1.35 5.02017 2.7784 2.60E-07 0.002731
1.4 5.15966 2.64551 1.20E-07 0.004078
1.45 5.29472 2.51753 6.00E-08 0.005909
1.5 5.42567 2.3941 2.90E-08 0.008331
1.55 5.55276 2.27492 1.40E-08 0.011455
1.6 5.67623 2.15969 6.90E-09 0.015398
1.65 5.79631 2.04816 3.40E-09 0.020272
1.7 5.9132 1.9401 1.70E-09 0.026184
1.75 6.02707 1.8353 8.30E-10 0.033231
1.8 6.13809 1.73356 4.20E-10 0.041498
1.85 6.24643 1.63471 2.10E-10 0.051055
1.9 6.35221 1.53858 1.10E-10 0.061954
1.95 6.45557 1.44502 5.40E-11 0.074226
2 6.55663 1.35391 2.80E-11 0.087883
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh-
1 4.04673 4.04673 0.000026 0.000026
1.05 4.23106 3.88223 0.000012 0.000052
1.1 4.39833 3.71685 5.50E-06 0.000101
1.15 4.55877 3.55934 2.60E-06 0.000186
1.2 4.71297 3.40899 1.20E-06 0.000326
1.25 4.86143 3.26518 5.80E-07 0.000547
1.3 5.00459 3.12737 2.80E-07 0.000882
1.35 5.14286 2.99507 1.40E-07 0.001372
1.4 5.27657 2.86787 6.60E-08 0.002066
1.45 5.40606 2.74538 3.20E-08 0.003022
1.5 5.53159 2.62727 1.60E-08 0.004304
1.55 5.65343 2.51323 7.90E-09 0.005982
1.6 5.7718 2.40299 3.90E-09 0.008131
1.65 5.88692 2.29631 2.00E-09 0.010829
1.7 5.99898 2.19296 9.90E-10 0.014155
1.75 6.10814 2.09273 5.00E-10 0.018187
1.8 6.21458 1.99545 2.60E-10 0.022997
1.85 6.31843 1.90094 1.30E-10 0.028655
1.9 6.41983 1.80904 6.80E-11 0.035222
1.95 6.51891 1.71962 3.50E-11 0.042751
2 6.61578 1.63255 1.80E-11 0.051282
Cleaning a Park
Summer Vacation Homework
ߚ, ߜ
ߚ, ߜ
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Table 8 Rosenbaum bounds 
 
Note: Gamma: log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors, sig+ (－): upper 
(lower) bound significance level, t-hat+ (－): upper (lower) bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate, 
CI+ (－): upper (lower) bound confidence interval (a = .95) 
Wage differences (2010)
Gamma sig+ sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI-
1 0.210814 0.210814 40.9836 40.9836 -65.9836 158.197
1.1 0.357605 0.106721 19.0164 68.5792 -89.5025 186.066
1.2 0.513926 0.049595 -2.45892 91.6096 -110.929 214.918
1.3 0.656422 0.021497 -22.0319 109.836 -134.52 242.259
1.4 0.771505 0.008803 -40.0661 132.992 -152.763 265.509
1.5 0.855944 0.00344 -59.7705 152.486 -172.865 291.275
1.6 0.913292 0.001293 -75.4224 168.967 -191.02 321.949
1.7 0.94986 0.000471 -88.7705 184.628 -210.443 342.623
1.8 0.971993 0.000167 -102.254 203.989 -225.978 365.984
1.9 0.984819 0.000058 -115 219.313 -240 393.063
2 0.991983 0.00002 -129.892 236.943 -259.264 414
Gamma sig+ sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI-
1 0.085028 0.085028 72.4772 72.4772 -31.3934 192.213
1.1 0.16958 0.03662 51.7213 96.7844 -54.0827 224.918
1.2 0.281704 0.014715 29.4486 117.122 -76.8033 255.373
1.3 0.408655 0.005595 12.2951 138.907 -96.1494 289.982
1.4 0.535744 0.002035 -6.50771 156.982 -119.566 322.5
1.5 0.651143 0.000714 -22.5 177.5 -137.523 349.69
1.6 0.748005 0.000243 -34.5753 198.907 -153.962 381.5
1.7 0.824255 0.000081 -47.7049 217.437 -173 406.795
1.8 0.881178 0.000026 -62.5228 236.202 -189.566 434.542
1.9 0.921831 8.40E-06 -75.9563 252.969 -206.992 462.204
2 0.949799 2.60E-06 -87.3179 273.5 -221.721 491.514
Cleaning a Park
Summer Vacation Homework
ߚ, ߜ
ߚ, ߜ
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Summer vacation homework (β, δ)  
 
 
Cleaning a park (β, δ)  
 
Figure 1 Histograms for propensity scores by treatment status 
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Appendix 1 Data structure regarding career paths 
A: 2 years ago B: For the past 2 years C: The current status
①Permanent employment (PE)
Experience in the TAW sector
②not PE
Unemployed (UE or NE)
③Permanent employment (PE)
Never in the TAW sector
④not PE
⑤Permanent employment (PE)
Experience in the TAW sector
Employed (PE, TE or DE) ⑥not PE
⑦Permanent employment (PE)
Never in the TAW sector
⑧not PE
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Appendix 2 Transition matrix of employment turnover 
 
2008-2011
(Whole)
Permanent Part-time Dispatch
Self-
employed
Family
businesses
Unemployed
Not
employed
(no job
search)
Average Obs.
Permanent 90.6% 4.2% 0.2% 1.7% 1.5% 1.8% 1373.5
Part-time 6.9% 78.9% 1.3% 3.7% 4.6% 4.6% 669
Dispatch 7.1% 30.4% 48.6% 0.0% 9.3% 4.6% 33.75
Self-employed
Family business
4.8% 5.5% 0.0% 83.3% 1.6% 4.8% 525.25
Unemployed 4.4% 19.6% 1.5% 3.0% 42.1% 29.4% 246
Not employed
(no job search activities)
2.0% 3.4% 0.1% 2.0% 6.2% 86.2% 912
2008-2011
(Male)
Permanent Part-time Dispatch
Self-
employed
Family
businesses
Unemployed
Not
employed
(no job
search)
Average Obs.
Permanent 91.9% 3.5% 0.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.5% 1011
Part-time 13.2% 68.5% 3.4% 3.3% 4.5% 7.1% 148.75
Dispatch 10.1% 44.6% 30.0% 0.0% 4.2% 11.1% 11.5
Self-employed
Family business
6.4% 2.6% 0.0% 86.3% 0.9% 3.8% 284.5
Unemployed 7.2% 12.6% 2.6% 3.5% 43.2% 30.8% 74.75
Not employed
(no job search activities)
3.0% 2.1% 0.2% 2.2% 4.4% 88.1% 253.75
2008-2011
(Female)
Permanent Part-time Dispatch
Self-
employed
Family
businesses
Unemployed
Not
employed
(no job
search)
Average Obs.
Permanent 87.1% 6.2% 0.4% 2.5% 1.4% 2.4% 362.5
Part-time 5.0% 81.9% 0.8% 3.9% 4.6% 3.8% 520.25
Dispatch 5.6% 22.2% 58.7% 0.0% 12.4% 1.1% 22.25
Self-employed
Family business
2.8% 9.0% 0.0% 79.8% 2.4% 6.0% 240.75
Unemployed 3.1% 22.7% 1.1% 2.7% 41.6% 28.7% 171.25
Not employed
(no job search activities)
1.5% 4.0% 0.1% 1.9% 7.0% 85.5% 658.25
